(Second of two articles)

In last week’s installment, Kurzban outlined how the U.S. concocted a crisis over the May 2000 elections despite Organization of American States (OAS) election observers characterizing the polling as “a great success for the Haitian population.” Washington made a fuss over the methodology used to determine run-offs, which affected only eight senate races, and later tried to call the whole election into question. However, a USAID-sponsored Gallup poll revealed that a majority of Haitian voters felt the elections had been honest and fair.

Nonetheless, the U.S.-backed opposition still boycotted the November 2000 presidential race, which Aristide won handily. As a gesture of goodwill, the seven Lavalas Family party senators involved resigned their posts shortly after Aristide’s inauguration. But Washington maintained an economic aid embargo on the country, which increased misery and discontent, as well as an arms embargo, which crippled the effectiveness of Haiti’s police force to keep order.

The Negotiations With the “Opposition”
As the Gallup Poll indicated, Haiti simply did not have a serious opposition in the wake of the 2000 parliamentary and Presidential elections. The result was a strategy orchestrated and funded by the U.S. through IRI and others to de-legitimize the Aristide government and stall as long as possible to allow economic chaos to reign so that Aristide’s government would topple.

The next two years were spent in “negotiations” with the opposition over how and when to have elections. Each time the opposition made an excuse, no matter how patently absurd, the U.S. government agreed with them and put more pressure on Aristide and his government. The international community, led by the U.S. and the OAS as their surrogate, for example, required the Haitian government to pay millions of dollars in restitution to opposition parties arising out of the attempted December 17th coup (during which opposition commandos briefly took over the National Palace) before they would pressure the opposition to make an agreement. When the government, whose resources were exhausted due to the embargo, paid the funds to the opposition, new demands were created. When Aristide agreed to the naming of a new CEP which would be controlled by the opposition, the opposition disagreed. When he asked them to seat their members on the CEP, they refused. The opposition was never pressured to take any steps required under the OAS resolution because they interpreted the document to require sequencing whereby the government had to act first. The U.S., with the opposition, always determined that the government failed to comply, and therefore they were never obligated to take any action.

The most disingenuous claim used repeatedly by the opposition and the U.S. was that the “security situation” was not sufficient to maintain a fair election. Long before the destabilizing efforts of Guy Philippe and Louis Jodel Chamblain, the U.S. claimed the security situation was not adequate for an election. However, Haiti did not have a recent history of violence in its elections, and the United States long advocated elections to diminish conflict in such countries as El Salvador or Guatemala even in the midst of their civil wars. At the same time, the U.S. continued its financial and arms embargo thereby making it impossible for the Haitian government, with virtually no resources, to further strengthen the police.

The desire to disrupt the country through economic destabilization however was not completely successful in the short run. Haitians were upset but they still supported democracy and knew that if Aristide was thrown out it meant the end of democracy in the country. The “opposition” recognizing they could not beat Aristide at the polls eventually developed a “street” strategy of confrontation.

The IRI, the Dominican Republic, the Group of 184 and Haitian Radio
By the end of 2002, it was clear that, despite the efforts of the U.S. and the opposition, they remained a small electoral force in the politics of Haiti. Most of their leaders had been marginalized within Haiti by the positions they were taking politically. In addition, their association with some of the worst elements of the former coup regime, who were now demanding the return of the army, further diminished their standing in the eyes of the Haitian people.

The IRI, realizing that their former strategy was not working decided to create a new opposition. They arranged a secret meeting, which became public in the Haitian press, in the Dominican Republic with assembly industry owner Andy Apaid, other business leaders, student activists, the Democratic Convergence, and other elements of the former regime, including those who were calling for the return of the army. Andy Apaid is a millionaire Lebanese American businessman in Haiti who bitterly opposed Aristide in his desire to increase the minimum wage and who was involved in a fraud on the Haitian telephone company through the “grey market” in international telephone transmission. He was ultimately fined 2,000,000 gourdes for the fraud.

Despite press reports of his “dual nationality,” he is not a Haitian citizen. Haitian law does not permit dual nationality. Mr. Apaid was born in New York City on April 24, 1952. He never renounced his U.S. citizenship. Although he obtained several Haitian passports by fraud, an immigration officer, doing his job, asked Apaid to produce a renunciation of U.S. citizenship before his Haitian passport could be renewed. He refused, and the officer refused to issue him a new Haitian passport. Apaid had long ties to the U.S. and particularly to the right-wing elements within the U.S. government.

As a result of the meeting in the DR, a new group called Group 184 was formed. Although the group claimed to represent 184 different organizations, most of these organizations had few or no members or did not exist at all. The significance of Group 184 was that it was a group of business leaders and the elite who were trying to force Aristide to have a negotiated settlement and to share power in a government of “national reconciliation.”

After their return from the DR, they announced the formation of the Group 184 and went to different cities promoting an agenda that was perceived in Haiti as simply an effort to topple the government. The demonstrations and meetings they held met with very little success, and they were largely seen as the elite trying to reimpose the old agenda on Haiti. Although they received a big boost from the events of December 5, 2003 where, under very clouded circumstances, the Haitian National Police were criticized for allowing popular organization members to enter the National University resulting in a number of injuries, their numbers were still relatively small.

Haitian radio stations, through gross distortions, sought to create the image that the Group 184 had major support within the country. When they had a demonstration of 100 people, radios would say that it was 1,000. When they had a demonstration of 10,000, they would report it was 50,000. Haitian radio was used in a way very similar to the use of TV in the coup attempt in Venezuela to confuse and demoralize government support and to exaggerate opposition support. It is no surprise that they would do this because the radio stations were owned by Apaid and the other business leaders who were part of Group 184. In fact one of these stations, Vision 2000, was given a small amount of money by USAID to strengthen its signal. The international press often relied on these radio stations to obtain the news, knowing that they were distorted and owned by the very opposition that was seeking power.

A media campaign was also launched in the United States to split the Haitian community and to undermine the support of the Congressional Black Caucus for democracy in Haiti. First, the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti made frequent trips to Miami and New York to organize a radio opposition to Lavalas and to appear on radio programs throughout South Florida. His message consistently faulted Aristide for all of Haiti’s problems and praised the opposition. As a result of his trips, numerous anti-Aristide programs were initiated. These programs distorted the government’s position and distorted the news coming out of Haiti. A second component of this disinformation campaign was the formation of the Haiti Democracy Project. Although it was funded, at least in part, by members of the opposition including Reginald Boulos, it was referred to by journalists as an independent and reliable source on Haiti. In fact, its articles and statements were vehemently anti-Aristide and little more than propaganda. Third, the elite-owned radio stations in Haiti, such as Vision 2000, expended more resources to provide programming that was used in the United States.

Gonaïves, Tatoune, Chamblain and the “Rag Tag” Army The final stages of the movement to end the democratic government of President Aristide began in Gonaïves. The press described the events in terms of a group who were Aristide supporters but had turned against him. The claim was that Butteur Metayer was seeking revenge against Aristide for ordering the execution of his brother, Amiot Metayer, and was using the weapons that Aristide gave his brother to topple Aristide. This “blowback” theory was quite popular in the press and Metayer was paraded around Gonaïves as the sponsor of the revolution against Aristide.

In fact, the real power in Gonaïves was Jean Tatoune, a former member of FRAPH and the Haitian army. Tatoune had been convicted of gross human rights violations and murder in the Raboto massacre that occurred in April 1994 during the coup. Tatoune was put on trial and was serving a life sentence when he and Amiot Metayer were broken out of prison. Although the U.S. consistently pressured the Aristide government to re-arrest Metayer (who was eventually executed by unknown persons), they never asked Aristide to arrest Tatoune. This was clearly taken as a sign that Tatoune was involved with the U.S. government in some way. In any event, Tatoune was never in the press but was organizing a military operation against Aristide in Gonaïves. He was successful, and Gonaïves was taken over in early February.

As soon as Gonaïves was taken over through Tatoune’s work, Jodel Chamblain, the co-founder of the paramilitary death squad FRAPH, and Guy Philippe, a former Haitian Army officer and well-known drug dealer, appeared in Gonaïves. They were accompanied by about 30 or 40 military personnel. Some people have alleged that some members of the group accompanying them spoke only Spanish. They were well armed, with new uniforms and flak-jackets. They were an obviously military-trained corps. They brought two truckloads of weapons from the Dominican Republic including M-16s, M-60s, rocket propelled grenades, and sufficient equipment to shoot down the one helicopter that the government had in its possession. The U.S. Department of Defense has admitted that the M-16s may have come from the 20,000 M-16s that the U.S. gave to the Dominican Army in February 2003 as part of “Operation Jaded Task.” This Operation, which was apparently secret because many Dominican legislators claimed they did not know about it, was ostensibly to train the Dominican army in counter-insurgency. It seems likely that Chamblain and his group were trained by the U.S. at that time.

Just as the press focused on Metayer in Gonaïves instead of Tatoune, they are now focusing on Philippe instead of Chamblain. However, Chamblain has long standing ties to the CIA and the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency). He was the co-founder of the paramilitary FRAPH organization that operated terrorist/execution squads against Lavalas supporters during the first military coup against President Aristide. Allan Nairn wrote a series of articles explaining how FRAPH was created at the direction of U.S. Col. Collins who was the DIA attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince during 1993. Prior to the actual formation of FRAPH and one month after the military coup in 1991, the CIA helped to form the Haitian Resistance League as a precursor to FRAPH. In addition, Chamblain’s co-founder in FRAPH, Emmanuel (Toto) Constant, stated on CBS’s “60 Minutes” in 1995 that he was an employee of the CIA while he worked for FRAPH. He stated it publicly because the US government was going to deport him after Aristide’s return. Chamblain had also been convicted of the murder of Antoine Izméry, a prominent Haitian businessman.

After Chamblain entered Haiti with this well trained military group, they easily went from town to town where the police, eviscerated by the financial and arms embargo, had no weapons to defend themselves. The police were facing M-16s and M-60s with 38 caliber pistols. It was no match. In addition, Chamblain began a U.S. military textbook psychological operations program using the Haitian radio stations owned by the elite to spread fear and terror among the police and the population.

As Chamblain’s group took over town after town, the international community rushed to Haiti to solve the problem by forcing Aristide into a power-sharing arrangement with the opposition. On Saturday, Feb. 18, 2004, President Aristide agreed to the power-sharing arrangement.

Roger Noriega, a fervent opponent of Aristide since his first election and a former staffer for Jessie Helms, represents the U.S. as the Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs. He and the other members of the international community then meet with the “opposition,” including Andy Apaid. At the end of the meeting, the opposition said they need to wait until Monday, Feb. 20. Noriega and the others give them the delay. On Sunday, Chamblain and his paramilitary group captured Cap Haïtien, the second largest city in Haiti. In order to capture the city, they must travel over very rugged terrain in the Haitian countryside because popular organizations (the only people left defending the city) blocked the only road into the city. Only experienced military personnel could have gone over that rugged terrain in order to accomplish the mission. Guy Philippe after capturing the city tells the AP that he was not in “official contact” with Apaid and the opposition. He also says he has been funded by Haitian businessmen.

As the days drag on and Secretary of State Powell personally begs Mr. Apaid to accept the deal, Chamblain and his paramilitary unit get closer and closer to Port-au-Prince. They arrive in Port-au-Prince on February 26, 2004 and the city is in a state of panic because the radio stations, as part of a psychological operations campaign, are spreading rumors that Aristide has left the country and that an invasion is imminent. Philippe then announces that he and his soldiers will not enter the city because they are waiting to see what the U.S. will do.

The stage is now set for the final squeeze play on Aristide. After stating publicly that the U.S. will not ask the President to step down, the State Department changes its position. Powell says that Aristide should “seriously consider” his position, suggesting he should go. President Bush joins the chorus. The French already set the stage the day before by saying that Aristide must leave. When the U.S. is asked why they will not send in troops to protect the constitutionally elected government, they say they are waiting for a political solution.

On Saturday afternoon, the Steele Foundation (the US security company protecting the President) tells the President that the U.S. has asked them to leave the country and has blocked their efforts to bring additional security that could have protected the President. To confirm this, the Counsel for the Government of Haiti receives a call on Friday night telling him that the Steele Foundation cannot send additional security to Haiti until Monday. When the Counsel says that Monday will be too late, there is silence on the line.

With Chamblain’s paramilitary group acting as the proverbial wolf-at-the- door and after the Steele Foundation tells the President they cannot provide the protection he needs to survive, the U.S. sends Deputy Chief of Mission Luis Moreno to meet with Aristide to deliver the coup de grace. From this point on, Aristide and his wife are told not to make any telephone calls because it is “too dangerous.” Moreno tells Aristide that he, his wife and all his followers will be killed. He tells him the U.S. will stand aside and allow it to happen and that the U.S. can provide aircraft for him to leave if he provides a resignation letter. They escort him to a Department of State rented aircraft in the early hours of Sunday morning under heavily armed U.S. guard. When Aristide refuses to give the U.S. the “resignation” letter until he is on the aircraft and knows where he is going, Moreno tells him they will not allow him on the aircraft and that he will be killed.

Aristide turns over the letter and, from that point on, he and his wife, who is a U.S. citizen, are kidnapped. Marines surround Aristide. He is separated from his security. He is told that neither he nor his wife can use a telephone despite the existence of telephones and faxes on the aircraft. He is told he cannot leave the aircraft when it stops. He is told by the Marines that they are instructed not to tell him where they are or where they are going. He is even told that he cannot open the shade on the window, and when his wife tries to do so, she is instructed to shut the shade. Aristide is unaware that he is going to the Central African Republic until close to the time they land in the country. Because the Central African Republic is a military dictatorship that overthrew a democratically elected government and because the military dictatorship has close ties to the French government, the Central African Republic is the last place Aristide would choose to go.

Both President Bush and Secretary Powell said that they would not send U.S. troops to Haiti until there was a political solution. Within an hour of Aristide’s departure, they order U.S. troops to Haiti without any political solution.