This week in Haiti
The First U.S. Occupation of Haiti Revisited
The Second of Two Parts
We continue this week with our presentation of extracts from Hans Schmidt's "The United States Occupation of Haiti: 1915-1934" (Rutgers University Press, 1995). Last week's selection explained how U.S. Rear Admiral William B. Caperton landed marines in Haiti on July 28, 1915 and orchestrated the election of a puppet president, Sudre Dartiguenave. The invasion met fierce resistance from guerilla fighters called "cacos." They were led by Charlemagne Péralte, who was killed by marines in 1919.Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan summed up the prevailing ignorance and arrogance of U.S. officials and officers toward Haiti when he declared: "Dear me, think of it! Niggers speaking French." Schmidt's excellent history lays bare the racism and brutality which underpinned the intervention, as well as the hegemonic designs of blossoming U.S. imperialism.
Dartiguenave was elected president on August 12, 1915, by the Haitian legislature, which convened under the protection of United States Marines instead of under the protection of a revolutionary caco army. [Secretary of the Navy Josephus] Daniels later stated that Dartiguenave's election "was undoubtedly not the choice of the mass of the Haitian people but only of those who felt that intervention by America was essential." After his election Dartiguenave personally thanked Caperton's chief of staff Captain Beach and insisted that Beach ride in the same car with him in the inaugural procession. Later Beach remarked that "Since his election, he [Dartiguenave] has repeatedly and publicly made known his intention, without reservation, to do everything the U.S. wishes." Beach felt that Dartiguenave, who was subsequently nicknamed "The Cat" by members of the American colony in Port-au-Prince, honestly believed that the interests of Haiti could best be served by complete cooperation with the United States.
As had been anticipated by American authorities, the client-government established by Dartiguenave was unable to control political unrest without direct American military support. Because of this as well as increasing uneasiness in Port-au-Prince and inflammatory propaganda against the government and the American occupation, Admiral Caperton declared martial law on September 3, 1915, less than a month after Dartiguenave's election. Along with the declaration of martial law, Caperton issued a contingent censorship promulgation which stated: "The freedom of the press will not be interfered with, but license will not be tolerated. The publishing of false or incendiary propaganda against the Government of the United States or the Government of Haiti, or the publishing of any false, indecent, or obscene propaganda, letters signed or unsigned, or matter which tends to disturb the public peace will be dealt with by the military courts."
Martial law, by which Haitian political offenders were tried in United States military courts, continued in effect until the strikes and riots of 1929. Dartiguenave informed the Americans that the declaration of martial law would greatly facilitate the passing of the proposed Haitian-American treaty that was to legalize the occupation.
Even with effective military occupation, control of all custom-houses and governmental revenues, and a handpicked client-president, the Wilson administration felt it necessary to legalize the occupation by means of a formal treaty with the client-government in Haiti. This treaty, in effect a unilateral declaration by the United States, was to be cited throughout the 1920s as a solemn moral and legal commitment to continue the occupation. Immediately after the election of Dartiguenave, [State Department Counselor Robert] Lansing instructed the American chargé at Port-au-Prince to negotiate a treaty that would incorporate all the demands made by Bryan during the unsuccessful negotiations which preceded the intervention. In addition, the United States took advantage of its greatly improved bargaining position and privileged relationship of a marine bodyguard, to exact new concessions. Lansing wrote to Wilson that the new treaty was "along the lines of the treaty which was sought to be negotiated a year ago last July (1914). It, of course, makes several alterations and additions covering the ground far more thoroughly and granting to this Government a much more extensive control than the original treaty proposed." The additions included the appointment of an all-powerful financial adviser by the president of the United States, establishment of a constabulary organized and officered by Americans, settlement of foreign claims, and American control of public works.
Despite the presence of a strong American military force and the cooperation of President Dartiguenave, Caperton experienced difficulties in getting the proposed treaty ratified by the Haitian legislature which, during the first two years of the occupation, was allowed to remain in existence. Caperton's patience and diplomacy were tried to the utmost, and at times he thought that the United States might have to set up a military government and abandon efforts to work through established Haitian political institutions. Part of the difficulty was disappointment among the legislators in Dartiguenave's client-government, which had been unable to bestow offices and expend public funds because of American control over all revenue. More than this, Caperton's repeated pledges of a loan and American financial aid were not backed up by the State Department.
In pressing for ratification of the treaty, Caperton had promised funds to alleviate the desperate financial embarrassment of the Dartiguenave government and made allusions to a bright economic future for the whole country. Caperton's requests to the State Department for a loan and for the release of government funds held by the American-controlled Banque Nationale were denied. The American chargé also urged an advance of funds, saying: "I am convinced that the Government is using its best efforts to secure ratification by Congress but its efforts are being seriously hampered and ratification endangered by the withholding of the gourdes."
Caperton urgently recommended a loan to bail out the Haitian government, which had unpaid salaries and was suffering sinking prestige, and, moreover, has incurred expenses "in educating country to realize necessity of ratifying treaty." He argued that unkept promises made by the State Department were weakening the position of the Dartiguenave government and that "enemies of the United States and of the treaty are taking advantage of this apparent lack of support.... American prestige is involved in this matter." For its part, the State Department had decided to withhold funds as a means of forcing ratification of the treaty and advised Caperton and Chargé Davis that the embarrassment of the Dartiguenave government would only be temporary. After passage of the treaty the State Department maintained that a loan could not be procured until after a settlement had been reached between the Haitian government and the Banque Nationale. In playing the proffered loan for all it was worth Lansing, who earlier had suggested increasing the salaries of Haitian legislators "to avoid their being liable to graft temptations," was apparently being more cynical in his attitude toward Haitian politics than was Caperton.
With the poor coordination in tactics employed by Caperton and the State Department and the breakdown of efforts to secure ratification by persuasion, Caperton employed threats and intimidation which proved successful. In early November 1915, he asked Dartiguenave for the names of the senators hostile to the treaty so that personal pressure might be applied, and a week later he relayed orders from Daniels to inform the Haitian Cabinet that "rumors of bribery to defeat the treaty are rife, but are not believed. However, should they prove true, those who accept or give bribes will be vigorously prosecuted. [Caperton had been instructed to make the threat of prosecution]... sufficiently clear to remove all opposition and to secure immediate ratification."
The treaty was ratified by the Haitian Senate the next day, and went into effect as a modus vivendi pending action by the United States Senate, which ratified the treaty unanimously and without debate in February 1916.
The treaty provided that the United States would aid Haiti in economic development and establish Haitian finances on a firm basis. An American-appointed financial adviser and general receiver of customs would have extensive control over Haitian government finances, and Haiti was forbidden to modify its customs duties or increase its public debt without United States approval. The United States would organize and officer a Haitian gendarmerie, and the Haitian government agreed to execute an arbitration protocol with the United States for settlement of foreign claims. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years from the date of the exchange of ratifications, which was May 3, 1916. Efforts by the Dartiguenave government to effectively participate in the drafting of the treaty were thwarted. A later State Department memorandum noted that "The Haitian Government attempted to make it appear that this treaty had been negotiated rather than dictated and suggested several changes in phraseology," but the department had insisted on its own phraseology.
Admiral Caperton and Captain Beach, who had successfully completed their assigned mission of forming a client-government and procuring the treaty, left Haiti early in 1916. Caperton had been the senior officer in charge of the occupation for a year and in this capacity had attempted to rule by persuasion rather that force. He took great pains not to offend Haitian pride and was personally liked by the Haitian elite. One Haitian contemporary referred to him as a "beau vieillard svelte" and an indefatigable dancer who held his partners tightly. Captain Beach, Caperton's representative ashore, spoke excellent French and paid social calls at Haitian homes where he made friends among the elite.
Caperton's policy of sympathy and consideration toward the Haitians was officially encouraged by Daniels, who later stated that he had ordered "all officers to regard themselves as friendly brothers of the Haitians sent there to help these neighbor people." Some effort was also made to instruct American troops that it was desirable to make a good impression. The detachments that landed at Cap Haïtien were ordered to treat Haitians with "utmost kindness and consideration" and to make friendly, if patronizing, gestures toward them. The troops were advised that "A cheerful word, a friendly pat on the man's back or the horse's rump, goes far to vitiate the sting of humiliation and will do much to change the natural feeling of resentment to one of respect and friendship." Cursing and shoving were prohibited. In general, the problem of personal relations between occupying forces and Haitians was not acute at the time of the intervention.
With the departure of Admiral Caperton the occupation entered a new phase. Colonel Littleton W.T. Waller, who had been commander of the Marine Expeditionary Forces in Haiti and was now the commander of the First Marine Brigade, succeeded Caperton as the senior United States officer in Haiti. American Financial Adviser Addison T. Ruan later remarked: "We have used two policies in Haiti, one of force and one of conciliation. Admiral Caperton employed conciliation. He made personal friends of leading Haitians, by associating with them. general Waller, seconded by Colonel (now Brigadier General) Butler, adopted a policy of force."
As Caperton's subordinate in charge of marines ashore, Waller had not gotten along well with the admiral, whom he referred to as "insane", complaining that, "Instead of backing up the men who are working for him, he knifes them when they do well." After Caperton's departure Waller asserted, "Since he left I have accomplished a great amount of work."
Colonel Waller apparently recognized that tact was necessary in dealing with Haitians and once cautioned his impulsive friend and subordinate, Major Smedley D. Butler, not to be crude in his treatment of the elite because, "There is more harm done by such an act than can be remedied by months of work and labor." Waller's own relations with Haitians, however, were difficult and strained. This was largely because of his racial prejudices, which approached outright scorn. He referred to one Haitian supplicant as "the blackest bluegum nigger you ever saw" and wrote to his friend colonel John A. Lejeune that "These people are niggers in spite of the thin varnish of education and refinement. Down in their hearts they are just the same happy, idle irresponsible people we know of."
Waller disliked Haitians of the elite governing class, believed that client-President Dartiguenave was "as big a crook as any of the others," and stated that "There is not an honest man in the whole of Haiti of Haitian nationality." His racial prejudice precluded cordial relations even at the ceremonial level; he confided to Colonel Lejeune: "They are real niggers and no mistake - There are some very fine looking, well educated polished men here, but they are real nigs beneath the surface. What the people of Norfolk and Portsmouth would say if they saw me bowing and scraping to these coons - I do not know - All the same I do not wish to be outdone in formal politeness."
By undiplomatic behavior and insulting directives Waller quickly incurred the enmity of Dartiguenave. At one point Waller threatened to leave Dartiguenave unprotected in hostile Port-au-Prince by withdrawing American forces for twenty-four hours if Dartiguenave continued to complain to the State Department.
Waller and many other marines made a sharp distinction between the masses of Haitian peasants and the elite, whose cultural accomplishments they derided. Toward the end of his stay in Haiti, Waller said, "I find myself intensely popular with the people but not on good terms with the ministers of the government." Major Smedley D. Butler shared this bias. In 1916 he wrote his father, Congressman Thomas S. Butler, concerning the death of an elite antagonist: "Last night the nephew of one of the prominent politicians attacked one of our Gendarme sentries, firing three shots at him. The Gendarme pursued him, and, finally blew a hole in him as big as your fist, thus ending the life of a miserable cockroach. This morning there is a big uproar among the prominent citizens over the 'unjustifiable' shooting of this leader of society. However, if all the leaders will only get busy and attack sentries we will soon clean up this country."
Butler divided the Haitian population into two categories: the 99 percent who went barefoot and the 1 percent who wore shoes. He expressed affection for the poor peasants but despised the elite, whom he "took as a joke," observing that "Without a sense of humor you could not live in Haiti among those people, among the shoe class." Given the pride and sensitivity of the Haitian elite, Butler's sense of humor was not appreciated. Disdain for the educated elite and complementary expressions of affection for the uneducated, impoverished peasant masses paralleled contemporary racist values in the United States, where Negroes were accepted, sometimes with fondness, so long as they "stayed in their place," while those who exhibited wealth, education, or ambition were subject to attack as "uppity niggers."
Despite the fact that the client-government was completely dependent upon American military protection, relations between it and the Waller-Butler team deteriorated rapidly. In mid-1916, Butler wrote Colonel Lejeune: "I have told these miserable ministers what I think of them and if I stay here [Butler remained in Haiti until March, 1918] they know exactly what to expect.... There will be a deadline drawn between me and the Haitiens, the same as there is in Egypt - between the British agents and the Egyptians.... This Government has lied to me two or three times, and I do not intend again to trust it or anybody in it."
In fact, both Waller and Butler favored unimpaired military government to the client-government arrangement with Dartiguenave. Waller wrote the United States military governor of Santo Domingo that "There has never been any doubt in my mind that a just military government is the method of controlling Haiti."
The arrogant treatment characteristics of the Waller-Butler period served
to disillusion many Haitians, even some of those who had welcomed the American
intervention as an opportunity for constructive reform. Dr. William W.
Cumberland, the leading American civilian official of a letter period,
observed that "I regret to say that some of the earlier authorities
were in constant turmoil with the Haitians, usually on racial and personal
grounds." Cumberland described Butler as a "misfit" and "a
man with about as little tact as one could ever meet," and added that,
"For years some of us had the job of trying to heal up the scars which
that gentleman left.".
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